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Abstract  
The 9-11 attack on the US brought a set of changes in overseas migration from Pakistan. One 
such change is the sharp increase in remittances sent from the United States. The paper 
argues that the characteristics of remittances from the United States differ from those 
originating in the Middle East. Just as the overseas Pakistani communities are diversified, the 
nature and characteristics of remittances are heterogeneous, depending on where they come 
from and who sends them. While the importance of remittance flows from the United States 
is rising, not much academic attention has been paid to this issue because of a lack of data. 
To better understand the reasons behind the increase in US remittances, and in order to 
evaluate their sustainability, household surveys are necessary. 
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Pakistani Migration to the United States: 
An Economic Perspective1 
 
Hisaya Oda 
Senior Research Fellow 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan 
 
Introduction 
Currently there are around 4 million overseas Pakistanis2, forming diaspora communities in various parts 
of the world3. In regional terms, the largest concentration of Pakistanis can be found in the Middle East, 
which hosts close to 2 million Pakistanis, 1.1 million of whom are in Saudi Arabia, and 500,000 in the 
United Arab Emirates. Other major concentrations are in the United Kingdom (with a Pakistani population 
of 800,000), the United States (600,000), and Canada (250,000). Pakistanis resident in these five countries 
constitute more than 80 percent of the overseas Pakistani population. 
These diaspora communities share similarities and differences. The similarities include a sense of being a 
Pakistani and the tendency to send money back to Pakistan; that is, remittances. The differences are in their 
economic and social backgrounds, and also in the nature of migration of individuals to each location. 
This paper highlights remittance flows from the United States. The 9-11 attacks caused several 
significant changes in the flow of remittances. One such change is the sharp increase in remittances sent 
from the United States. Pakistan’s recent economic growth was partly the outcome of these remittance 
                                                  
1 I would like to express my gratitude to the State Bank of Pakistan and the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas 
Employment of the Government of Pakistan for providing me with the data necessary for writing this paper and 
for discussions on current migration trends. I also benefitted from comments from participants in the 20th IAHA 
Conference held at Jawaharlal Nehru University from Nov. 14 to Nov. 17, 2008. I myself am responsible for any 
errors. This work was supported by KAKENHI 20510242, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C).  
2 The definition of an overseas Pakistani here is a Pakistani citizen who has migrated to another country or an 
individual of Pakistani ethnicity born outside Pakistan.  
3 Figures on overseas Pakistanis are from Year Book 2004-2005, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Labour, 
Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis. 
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flows. Previous studies have tended to examine the migratory flows of Pakistanis to Britain and the Middle 
East. Among the subjects of previous studies has been the impact of remittances, particularly those from the 
Middle East, on household well-being in Pakistan. However, despite their importance, the migration stream 
of Pakistanis to the United States and the impact of American remittances have been neglected by all but a 
few studies. This paper presents a preliminary analysis aimed at filling this deficiency.  
In this paper, first, I briefly review the history of Pakistani migration to the United States, and then 
discuss the changing patterns of migration and the profile of migrants. Second, I examine the trends of 
remittance flows to developing countries and Pakistan, and also discuss the roles of remittances in the 
economy. Third, I analyze factors that explain the increasing trend of remittances from the United States 
and discuss how remittances from the US are spent. 
 
A Review of Patterns of Emigration from Pakistan to the United States 
Emigration to the United States constitutes a major episode of population movement from Pakistan4. 
Compared to Pakistani migration to Britain5, the migratory flow to the United States is a relatively recent 
development. Before the mid-1960s, the number of Pakistani migrants to the United States was very limited 
due to the national origins quota system, which was first introduced under the Emergency Quota Act of 
1921. The Luce-Celler Act of 1946 removed the ban on South Asians but allowed only 100 immigrants per 
year. Most Pakistani immigrants during the period from 1947 to 1965 were students and dependents of 
those already settled. 
But the Immigration and Nationality Act amendments of 1965 (the Hart-Cellar Act) ended the quota 
system and increased the number of immigrants from 150,000 to 290,000 per year. It gave preference to 
family-related immigration and also welcomed skilled migrants. The Act created a favorable opportunity 
for Pakistanis who wished to migrate to the United States. Taking advantage of the 1965 Act, many 
Pakistanis, particularly those who possessed skills and professionals such as doctors, left Pakistan for 
                                                  
4 Despite its importance, Pakistani migration to the United States has been neglected by all but a small number 
of studies, examples of which are Arif and Irfan [1997], Burki [2005] and Najam [2007]. 
5 Pakistani migration to Britain has been studied quite extensively. Ballard and Werbner’s contributions are 
particularly well known. For examples, see Ballard [1987, 1990, 1994] and Werbner [1990, 1994]. 
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America. Figure 1, taken from Najam [2007], portrays the trend in the number of Pakistani migrants to the 
United States and clearly shows the increase in numbers after 1965.  
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FIGURE 1: Number of Pakistanis admitted to 
the United States, 1965-2006
 
 
Another turning point was the period from the late 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s when the United 
States permitted the immigration of agricultural workers and introduced the green cards system, by which 
visas are awarded by lottery. This caused a wave of blue-collar workers to emigrate from Pakistan to the 
United States. As a result of these new schemes, the number of Pakistani immigrants increased significantly 
and reached more than 20,000 in 1991. It can be assumed that the immigrants were relatively unskilled 
migrants who found jobs such as taxi drivers and shopkeepers in the Manhattan district of New York and in 
other big American cities. 
The estimated size of the Pakistani community in the United States in 2005 was around 600,000. The 
figure reported in the US 2000 census was 230,000. The gap can be explained by the tendency of the US 
census to count only Pakistani immigrants, excluding those born in the United States between Pakistani 
parents, while the figure provided by the Government of Pakistan was based on a survey conducted by the 
Pakistan Embassy in the United States.  
Pakistani communities in the United States are also clustered, with New Jersey and New York being the 
two leading host states. The Pakistani population in these two states accounts for about 40 percent of total 
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Pakistani population in the United States. If California, Texas and Illinois are added, the ratio increases to 
close to 70 percent. Cities such as the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, Chicago (Illinois), and 
Houston (Texas) attract a substantial number of Pakistanis6.  
In terms of sending areas, the American Pakistani community is more diverse, with American Pakistanis 
coming from various parts of Pakistan. This contrasts with the situation in Britain, where Pakistani 
immigrants tend to come from particular districts in Pakistan such as the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir.  
The educational levels of Pakistanis in the US are probably higher than those in Britain. The 2005 
American Community Survey undertaken by the US Census Bureau shows that among the male Pakistani 
population aged 25 years and over, 60.9 percent had bachelor’s degrees or higher while the American 
average for the same category was 28.5 percent. Among female Pakistani residents aged 25 years and over, 
the figure was 45.0 percent while the US female average was 26.0 percent. This might be due to the fact 
that Pakistani immigrants into the United States during the 1960s and 70s were mainly skilled people and 
professionals. It follows that Pakistanis who arrived in America during those periods were from relatively 
well-off families and were well educated. 
This gap in educational levels probably explains differences in the levels of earnings. In 2005, the mean 
and median incomes for Pakistani male full-time workers in the United States were US$59,310 and 
US$42,718 respectively, while those for American male full-time workers were US$56,724 and 
US$41,9657. Similarly, the figures for Pakistani female full-time workers are also higher than those of 
American female workers. From these figures, it can be said that Pakistani workers earn more because of 
their relatively high educational levels. But the difference seems rather small compared to the difference in 
educational levels between the American average figures and those for the Pakistani immigrants. Possible 
reasons for this are 1) discrimination against immigrants and the non-white population, and 2) the quality of 
education in Pakistan. 
 
                                                  
6 The 2006 American Community Survey shows the distribution of the Pakistani population by metropolitan 
centers. 
7 Figures are from the 2005 American Community Survey. 
 5
TABLE 1. Educational and Income Levels of Pakistani migrants to the US
US Average Pakistani in the US
Educational Attainment (Pop. 25 years and over) (%)
  Male, bachelor's degree or higher 28.5 60.9
  Female, bachelor's degree or higher 26.0 45.0
Income (US$)
  Median earning for full time, year round
     Male 41,965 42,718
     Female 39,890 44,019
  Per capita Income 25,035 23,540
  Poverty Ratio (%) 10.2 14.9
Source: 2005 American Community Survey .  
 
While the average earning level of Pakistani immigrants is higher than the American average, the per 
capita income of Pakistanis is lower than the average. The former amounts to US$20,585 and the latter to 
US$25,035. This is due to the difference in household size. The average household size among Pakistanis 
living in America is 3.71, considerably higher than the American average of 2.60. We should also note that 
the 14.9 percent poverty ratio among American Pakistanis is higher than the American average of 10.2 
percent. 
The number of Pakistani migrants to the United States followed an upwards trend until 2001 but the 9-11 
incidents put the flow into reverse. The 9-11 terrorist attacks brought about an adverse change in American 
attitudes towards Muslims, including Pakistanis, and have led the American authorities adopt a tougher 
stance on immigration applications from Pakistan. This change in policy was reflected in a dramatic fall in 
the number of Pakistani immigrants admitted to the United States, from 16,448 in 2001 to 9,444 in 20038. 
However, this drop turned out to be short lived, and after 2004, the number of Pakistani immigrants began 
to recover. By 2006, it had reached a total of 17,418, the second largest annual number for the last fifty 
years (Batalova and Ferruccio [2008]). 
 
 
 
                                                  
8 Figures are for the number of Pakistani immigrants admitted for permanent residence and are taken from 
Najam [2006]. 
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Remittance Flows to Developing Countries and Pakistan 
Remittances are the most important instrument for linking immigrants with their country of origin. 
Whatever the reasons may be, immigrants have a motive to remit some of their earnings back to their home 
country. With the progress of globalization, the number of immigrants around the world has increased and 
accordingly the amount of remittances is also much greater than it used to be. 
Figure 2 illustrates the trend in resource inflows into developing countries. As can be seen, remittance 
flows to developing countries have been steadily increasing and the speed of increment seems to have 
accelerated in recent years. The volume of remittances is not as large as that of FDI and private 
debt/portfolio equity, but it has nevertheless exceeded the amount of official development aid (ODA) to 
developing countries since the early 1990s. In 2007, the total volume of remittances recorded amounted to 
US$ 251.5 billion, which is more than double the size of ODA in the same year.  
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It is however important to note that the remittance data presented in Figure 2 are derived from official 
records of remittance flows. These records capture only the remittance flows made through formal channels 
such as banks and post offices. However, it is quite evident that many migrants use informal transfer 
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mechanisms such as hundi and hawala. Also money or payment in kind can be carried by migrants when 
they return home. The amount of money transferred by way of these methods is quite substantial and 
unrecorded. If recorded, the size of remittances would far exceed the amount of FDI and private debt/equity 
(See El-Qorchi et al. [2003]). 
Before the mid-1970s, remittance flows to Pakistan were limited because of the small number of 
migrants and the nature of emigration. Many migrants to Britain and the United States were accompanied 
by their families, so that they did not have to transfer money9. As the number of migrants to countries in the 
Middle East increased in the 1970s, the amount of remittances to Pakistan also increased as Pakistani 
workers needed to send money back to support their families left behind and to repay their debt if the cost 
of migration had been financed by borrowing (Figure 3). In 1983, the amount of remittances even exceeded 
Pakistan’s export volume in that year.  
However, as the number of Pakistani migrant workers fell in the 1980s, the remittance flows also started 
shrinking after having reached a peak in 1983. This declining trend continued until 2001. While the 
fluctuation in the number of Pakistani migrant workers can to some extent explain the changes in the 
amount of remittances, we also need to consider other factors such as the increasing dependence on 
informal channels as a possible explanation for the decline. 
The declining trend in official remittance flows to Pakistan was reversed after September 11, 2001, due to 
an international crackdown on informal routes of money transfer. Tough controls on the use of these 
informal channels led overseas migrants including Pakistani workers to channel money through formal 
transfer mechanisms. This resulted in a significant boost to the officially recorded increase of remittances. 
The remittances through official channels were US$920 million in 2000/01, but increased sharply to 
US$2.3 billion in 2001/02. The figure of 2007/08 was US$6.4 billion. It seems this upward trend still 
continuing and the amount is likely to exceed US$7 billion in 2008/09. 
                                                  
9 Instead, they purchased land and built a house in their home town, dreaming that they would live there after 
returning to their home country in the future. See Ballard [1987] concerning migrants from Mirpur district to the 
UK. 
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As for the countries of origin of the remittances, the largest share, from 1976/77 until 2001/02, came 
from Saudi Arabia (Figure 4). Remittances from the Middle East accounted for more than 70 percent of 
total remittances to Pakistan. However, remittances from the United States have increased significantly 
since the 9-11 incident, surpassing those from Saudi Arabia. The United States has been the largest source 
of remittances to Pakistan since 2002/03. Remittances from Saudi Arabia are also increasing, but the rate of 
growth in remittances from the USA has been far faster. In 2000/01, the amount of remittances from Saudi 
Arabia was US$309.9 million and thereafter increased to US$1.25 billion. During the same period, the 
amount of remittances from the USA increased from US$ 73.3 million to US$ 1.72 billion. 
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Source: Economic Surveys , Government of Pakistan
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A Note on Remittances from the United States  
Factors that help to explain the increasing trend of remittances from the United States are (1) the 
crackdown on informal mechanisms of money transfer, (2) the shift of wealth from America to Pakistan, 
and (3) rapid economic growth under the Musharraf regime. The first factor has already been mentioned. 
Due to the tight surveillance of informal channels, money which used to be transferred informally is now 
remitted through formal channels. The second and third factors, both of which are closely related, need 
some explanation. The fact is that the shift of wealth from the United States to Pakistan has been caused by 
a change of sentiment among Pakistani Americans. Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, the American bank 
accounts of Muslim individuals/businesses suspected to be involved in financing terrorism were frozen in 
an attempt to contain financial flows to terrorist groups by the United States federal government. This 
action planted a fear among Pakistanis living in America that their accounts might be suspended in the 
future. Also after the 9-11 event, Americans’ attitudes toward Muslims became hostile, and seemed to be 
based on the assumption that all Muslims were terrorists. This made Pakistanis in the United States search 
for safe places in which to deposit their wealth.  
They soon found Pakistan to be a safe alternative as Pakistan’s economy started to undergo a new era of 
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development after having suffered low growth during the decade of the 1990s. Moreover consistent 
economic policies and macroeconomic stability within Pakistan functioned as pull factors. The timing was 
perfect because Pakistanis in America were looking for a place to put their wealth and hoped to possibly 
gain some economic profits at the same time, and Pakistan was becoming an attractive investment 
destination. The rapid economic growth and improving prospects attracted investors and Pakistani 
Americans were looking for more favorable investment opportunities.  
The growth momentum was triggered largely by President Musharraf’s decision to join the team of the 
“war against terrorism” led by the Bush administration. This decision opened the way for external debt 
reduction by the Paris Club, and this helped ease the Pakistan government’s fiscal position as well as the 
balance of payments. Before the restructuring of debt by the Paris Club, the size of Pakistan’s external debt 
was 49.0 percent of its GDP (in 2000/01) and the servicing of the debt consumed a significant portion of 
foreign exchange earnings. If domestic debt was included, the size of the entire public debt (domestic and 
external) exceeded 100 percent of GDP and interest payments consumed around 50 percent of public 
spending, crowding out expenditures necessary for infrastructure development and for the improvement of 
social sectors such as education and health. However, after the Paris Club agreement, the size of external 
debt was reduced to 34.4 percent of GDP in 2003/04, resulting in a substantial reduction of debt servicing. 
This restructuring of external debt came as a great relief to Pakistan. 
The United States government also provided the Musharraf regime with a substantial amount of 
economic and military aid, and this aid helped Pakistan to achieve a higher rate of economic growth. In 
addition to this, investors around the world became interested in opportunities being provided by emerging 
countries, the advancement of the BRICs economies being a major factor in this change of attitude. 
Pakistan was defined as one of the more promising investment destinations, and capital began flowing into 
the country. FDI and portfolio investments increased substantially from only US$ 322 million in 2000/01 to 
over 5 billion in 2006/07.  
The higher economic growth of Pakistan attracted remittances not only from the United States but also 
from other nations. In turn, these remittances contributed to further economic growth. During the five years 
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from 2002/03 to 2006/7, Pakistan’s average annual growth rate of GDP was more than 7 percent, and part 
of this achievement was the result of the increased amount of remittances flowing into the country from 
abroad (Figure 5). 
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Economic Impact of Remittances 
The analysis of the impact of remittances on an economy at the macro and micro levels is an important 
issue in development studies. At the macro level, needless to say, remittances are an important source of 
foreign exchange. Remittances are particularly valuable to countries such as Pakistan, which has long 
experienced current account imbalances. Another important aspect of remittances is their impact on 
economic growth. On the other hand, analysis of the growth effect of remittances is fraught with problems. 
One of the difficulties concerns the nature of the data. As has already been pointed out, we can only use 
official data, which record remittances through formal channels. Remittances sent through informal 
channels are not recorded but it has been recognized the amount involved is substantial. In short, it is 
impossible to accurately measure the true size of remittance flows. 
At the micro level, a number of studies have been conducted on various relevant topics. In the Pakistani 
context in particular, the impact of remittances on well-being and on poverty reduction of the recipient 
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households is a pressing issue since one-third of population of Pakistan is living below the poverty line. In 
particular, this issue is very pertinent to the households of Middle East migrants’ households many of which 
see overseas migration as a key element in the struggle to escape from poverty.  
So far, studies of this aspect have found a positive association between remittances and poverty reduction. 
One such example is the work of Arif [2004]. By using nation-wide household data, his study shows that 
the incidence of poverty was reduced by foreign remittances. Oda [2007], who has carried out a field 
survey in the barani area of Punjab Province, confirms Arif’s results and arrives at the same conclusion. 
While he recognizes the positive impact of remittances on poverty reduction, he also points out that only 
those who can finance the high cost of overseas migration are able to migrate. He argues that the chances to 
migrate are not fairly distributed and therefore the poor remain poor.  
An interesting question regarding remittances is how they are spent by recipients. This is particularly 
important because of perceptions concerning the impact of remittances on economic development. 
Unfortunately many studies report that a significant proportion of remittances has been spent on personal 
consumption or unproductive items such as housing/real estate investment. For example, Gilani et al. 
[1981] report that 62 percent of remittances were spent on current consumption and 22 percent on real 
estate. However, based on village-level surveys, Oda [2007] shows that although remittances were spent 
mainly on daily consumption, they were also used to finance the schooling of household members, a type of 
expenditure that is considered a productive investment in the long run. 
One issue that needs to be examined is the impact on the Pakistani economy of the recent increase of 
remittance flows from the United States. Are the remittances from the United States spent in the same way 
as those from the Middle East? How long will this increasing trend continue? In fact, American remittances 
to Pakistan differ markedly from the Middle Eastern remittances as the recent increase of the former is 
motivated mainly by the search for economic profits while the latter is primarily for helping to finance daily 
needs. There is abundant anecdotal evidence on the use of American remittances. For example, it is said that 
the recipients have spent these remittances on the purchase of real estate in large cities such as Karachi, 
Lahore, and Islamabad. As a result, property prices in those cities shot up to a level at which ordinary 
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Pakistanis were unable to buy a plot of land for their own housing. Unfortunately, official data on land 
prices in Pakistan are not available, and it is consequently impossible to estimate the precise impact of 
American remittances on the land price increase in Pakistan’s big cities. 
Other examples are the purchase of stocks and shares and consumer durables such as automobiles. The 
KSE 100, which is the benchmark of the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), increased from 1,247 points 
immediately prior to the 9-11 attack to over 15,000 points in early 2008 (See Figure 6). Although no 
breakdown of capital inflows to the stock market is available, there seems to be a clear positive correlation 
between the inflow of remittances and the movement of the KSE 100. Assuming this to be the case, it is 
probably safe to say that remittances from the United States pushed stock prices upwards to a considerable 
extent. Meanwhile annual sales of automobiles increased from slightly under 35,000 in 1999/00 to more 
than 180,000 in 2006/07. This suggests that excess liquidity created by remittances allowed recipient 
households to buy luxury items such as cars. 
The issue of sustainability of the US remittances is a primary concern for policy makers as in recent years, 
Pakistan has come to depend heavily on remittances to cover trade deficits. If the motivation of American 
remittances to Pakistan is purely economic, one might conclude that a slowdown in the Pakistan economy 
would affect the inflow negatively. But what is happening is in fact the opposite. After achieving 9.0 
percent GDP growth in 2004/05, Pakistan’s economy slowed down slightly, with GDP growth rate falling 
from 6.6 percent in 2006/07 to 5.8 percent in 2007/08. It is estimated that the GDP growth rate will be 
below 5 percent in 2008/09. But despite this declining trend, remittances from the US are increasing. How 
can we explain this apparent contradiction? If migrants to America were from the poor classes in Pakistan, 
they would have a stronger incentive to send money back home to support their families or relatives, but it 
seems that they are not from such classes. Rather, they came from the relatively well-off social strata. 
Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that the amount of remittances increases when the national economy 
is experiencing a slowdown in economic growth, as is argued by Lucas and Stark [1985]. The paradox of 
the slowing economy and the increase of remittances needs further investigation. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This paper has briefly reviewed the history of Pakistani migration to the US. It has shown that the 
formation of overseas Pakistani communities in the US has been influenced by changes in the immigration 
policies of the US government. The paper also analyzed the link between migrants and remittances. Until 
1970s, Britain and the United States were the primary destinations for Pakistani migrants. Overseas 
migration led to the formation of diasporas, and migration opportunities were confined to a certain segment 
of the society. As a result, the overall economic impact of remittances from overseas migrants was not 
significant. But the oil boom in the Middle East during the 1970s brought about considerable changes in the 
nature of overseas migration from Pakistan. Migration became more temporary and the oil boom opened up 
many more opportunities for migration. Remittances from the Middle East became substantial and drew a 
lot of attention from policy makers because of their impacts at macro and household levels. The 9-11 attack 
on the US brought another set of changes in overseas migration from Pakistan. While entry to the US 
became more restrictive, and while migration to all developed countries became more difficult, remittances 
from these countries increased sharply. Pakistan’s recent economic growth has owed much to these 
remittance flows. 
The paper also argued that the characteristics of remittances from the United States differ from those 
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originating in the Middle East. Essentially this finding has shown that just as the overseas Pakistani 
communities are diversified, so the nature and characteristics of remittances are also not homogeneous, but 
rather are heterogeneous, depending on where they come from and who sends them. While the importance 
of remittance flows from the United States is rising, not much academic attention has been paid to this issue 
because of a lack of data. To better understand the reasons behind the increase in US remittances, and in 
order to evaluate their sustainability, household surveys are necessary. These should be aimed at clarifying 
who is sending money from the United States to Pakistan, who is receiving it, and in what ways the 
remittances are being spent. 
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